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BOOK REVIEWS

The God Delusion, by Richard Dawkins. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006.
Pp. 416. $27.00 (hardback).
ROBERT OAKES, University of Missouri
One of Elizabeth Bishop's remarkable and widely cited poems, "One Art,"
opens with this somewhat poignant observation: "The art of losing isn't
hard to master." With apologies to Bishop for an abrupt and abrasive de
scent into the prosaic, The God Delusion makes it clear that, unfortunately,
this is also true of the "arts" of cliche-mongering and caricature. Indeed,
the quality of Richard Dawkins's polemic against classical supernatural
ism is, for the vast most part, paradigmatically sophomoric. Moreover,
while civility is not entirely absent from his deliberations, the tone of his
discussion tends all too often to be surly, arrogant, and self-congratula
tory. As a representative example, Dawkins tells us early on of his hope
concerning his book that "religious readers who open it will be atheists
when they put it down" (p. 5). He realizes, however, that this is "pre
sumptuous" of him. But exactly why does he regard this as a vain hope?
A touch of humility? Hardly. It is because "dyed-in-the-wool faith-heads
are immune to argument," which, in turn, is largely due to their "child
hood indoctrination" (p. 5). Apart from the implied insult that committed
theists or "faith-heads"—the class of which includes, of course, Aquinas,
Augustine. Abelard, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Maimonides and
Gersonides—are intellectually inferior to atheists, is Dawkins actually un
aware that there are many ardent theists who were raised as atheists—or
at least as agnostics—by their parents?
Before moving into disputational high-gear, it seems to me that a
question can tenably be raised about Dawkins's writing style. On the
back cover of the book, one of the pre-publication reviewers character
izes him as "one of the best nonfiction writers alive today." It is hard to
see this as something short of hyperbolic praise. (See the other blurbs
there as well.) For it can hardly be plausible to regard superb nonfiction
writing as failing to preclude the persistent use of annoyingly erzatz
"New Age" platitudes such as "raising our consciousness." (Hooray for
high ceilings!) On the first page of his "Preface," Dawkins tells us that
he is out
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to raise consciousness—raise consciousness to the fact that to be an athe
ist is a realistic aspiration, and a brave and a splendid one . . . this
is the first of my consciousness-raising messages. I also want to raise
consciousness in three other ways. (my italics)
On and on it goes. One can hardly count the references to "consciousness
raising" or "raised-consciousness" in the section entitled (can you guess?)
'Natural Selection as a Consciousness-Raiser' (pp. 114-18).
Stylistic issues, however, are largely overshadowed by conceptual ones.
Just as an appetizer, Dawkins claims that "atheists are a lot more numer
ous, especially among the educated elite, than many realize" (p. 4). And
he goes on to contend that this was also true in the nineteenth century.
In support of the latter, Dawkins cites John Stuart Mill (no source given):
"The world would be astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its
brightest ornaments . . . are complete skeptics in religion."
Well, astonished or not, Dawkins's assertion here is about atheists, while
Mill is speaking of skeptics in religion. Accordingly, Mill's contention fails
to support Dawkins's claim. A world which contained only believers and
skeptics on the question of God's existence would, ipso facto, contain no
atheists at all.
At the outset of chapter two, "The God Hypothesis," there is a diatribe
against "the God of the Old Testament," who, according to Dawkins, "is
arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: . . . a petty, unjust,
misogynistic, homophobic [afraid of homosexuals?], racist . . . capriciously
malevolent bully." Presumably, Dawkins echoes here the assessment of
Thomas Jefferson: "God is a being of terrific character—cruel, vindictive,
capricious and unjust" (p. 31). Now since there is hardly space in this re
view for an extended excursus into Biblical exegesis—even if I had the
requisite expertise in this area—let me simply note the following: while
Scripture is clearly taken by classical monotheists to constitute the re
ceptacle of God's revealed Wisdom, it has long been understood that the
Bible is written in human language. Accordingly, it is a vulgar error (though
hardly an infrequent one) to maintain that religious orthodoxy requires Scrip
tural literalism. Maimonides, for example, widely regarded as the premier
expositor of traditional Judaism, argues vigorously—along, of course,
with many distinguished Christian thinkers—against Biblical literalism,
regarding it as "darkening the brilliance" of Divine Revelation. Moreover,
it is the Oral Law—taken to be Divine in origin and elaborated by the Rab
bis of old—which is authoritative for normative Judaism. (For example,
while the lex talionis—the Biblical principle of "an eye for an ey e"—has
often been scorned as a principle of vengeance, Rabbinic Judaism makes
it perfectly clear that this is to be understood solely as a legal requirement
of "compensation for damages:" that innocent victims who suffer harm or
loss be compensated for such damages by the relevant perpetrators.) Ac
cordingly, it seems clear there is an arguably significant analogy between
the Oral Law in Judaism and the significant teaching role of the Magisterium within the Church.
Moving on to Dawkins's polemic against the God-Hypothesis as such,
the major thesis of his book seems to be that classical supernaturalism
constitutes "a pernicious delusion" for the following reason:
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[A]ny creative intelligence of sufficient complexity to design anything,
comes into existence only as the end product o f an extended process o f grad
ual evolution. (p. 31, Dawkins's italics)
Why should we construe this postulate—Dawkins calls it his "alternative
vieW" — as anything less than a scientistic monstrosity? Why would any
one find it compelling or even attractive? Since Dawkins tells us that the
"central argument" of his book is contained in chapter four ("W hy There
is Almost Certainly No God"), it seems proper to infer that this chapter
is "designed" (sorry!) to support this "alternative view" (p. 157). But it
seems clear that there is nothing close to a compelling argument in this
chapter (or, indeed, elsewhere in the book) for the proposition which con
stitutes his "alternative view."
Intriguingly, however, it seems readily demonstrable that even if we
become drunk with charity and grant Dawkins his radical postulate here,
it fails to imply that the universe has not been (created and) designed by
a transcendent intellect, i.e., Dawkins's "alternative view" is compatible
with the following: there existed a cosmos prior to the present one; call
it the earlier cosmos. Moreover, life-forms came into existence at the ear
lier cosmos solely as a result of naturalistic evolution. This process finally
reached its "end-stage," at which time it gave rise to a Being (B) with the
creative and intellective power to produce and design a cosmos. However,
there already existed (ex hypothesi) a cosmos at that time, i.e., the non te
leological cosmos which eventually gave rise to B. However, B decided to
dispense with the earlier cosmos and replace it with one which is more to
his liking: a cosmos which conforms to his design-plan. And this newer
cosm os—this teleological cosm os—is in fact the one which we now inhabit.
Accordingly, Dawkins's "alternative view" fails to imply that the cosmos
we now inhabit is undesigned.
Since Dawkins's book is so strongly focused on the issue of Designversus-Natural-Selection, it is hardly unreasonable to expect that his ren
dering of the classical Argument from Design would have the virtue of
accuracy (p. 79). Unfortunately, this is not the case. (Also, a fact-checker
would not have been a bad idea. The howler I have in mind is Dawkins's
claim that the Design Argument "is the only one in regular use today.")
His ill-formed exposition of the Argument is as follows:
Things in the world, especially living things, look as though they
have been designed. Nothing that we know looks designed unless it
is designed. Therefore there must have been a designer and we call
him God.
This argument by Dawkins clearly fails to constitute an acceptable version
of the Teleological Argument; for at the heart of the latter is the notion that
there obtains enough of an analogy between natural objects and human ar
tifacts to make it plausible to conclude that the cosmos is designed. More
over, and perhaps because analogical reasoning is inherently inductive
or probabilistic, philosophical theologians—in contradistinction to what
Dawkins maintains—tend not to regard the Design Argument as "the ulti
mate knockdown argument" for the truth of theism (p. 79).
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Dawkins also addresses (in chapter three, "Arguments for God's ex
istence") the arguments by Aquinas and Anselm, and, at least insofar as
his discussion of Anselmian reasoning is concerned, his critique seems
especially shallow and platitudinous. He apparently knows nothing of
the influential reconstructive work of, for example, Plantinga and Hartshorne on this argument. Dawkins is also predictably unfriendly to "the
Argument from Personal Experience" (pp. 87-92). His discussion clearly
implies, mistakenly, that this argument rests heavily on "visions" and oth
er sensory manifestations. For distinguished figures within the mystical
tradition of Classical Supernaturalism have long displayed very little con
fidence in "sensory imagery" as a trustworthy indication of Divine Rev
elation. Also, Dawkins considers many other arguments in this chapter, a
number of which are remarkably silly, and, accordingly, would hardly be
defended by any self-respecting theist (see p. 36). Dawkins seems to have
the notion that classical supernaturalism is weakened or damaged by the
fact that there are religious believers who have offered embarrassingly
awful arguments for the existence of God. But that, of course, is like main
taining that medical science is fraudulent because there are fraudulent
practitioners of medicine.
I know of very few (if any) philosophical theists who subscribe to the
"Creationist" doctrine that there can be no acceptable version of the thesis
of common ancestry. Rather, what is central to Classical Supernatural
ism in this regard is that the doctrine of biological evolution fails to pre
clude the existence of God, and, moreover, that the evolutionary process
(at every stage) cannot tenably be regarded as having taken place in the
absence of Divine guidance. (Dawkins has, of course, yet to respond to
Plantinga's influential argument that the hypothesis of purely naturalistic
evolution is self-defeating.) Intriguingly, then, Dawkins and the Creation
ists agree on something quite major: that Evolutionism and Theism are in
compatible. However, since incompatibility is clearly mutual, Dawkins's
position entails of course that Evolutionism and Theism preclude each
other. Accordingly, he (in effect) maintains—no less than proponents of
"creation science" maintain—that traditional theism precludes any ver
sion of the doctrine of biological evolution. But why should we believe
for even a moment that he has succeeded in establishing that? Accord
ingly, why should we believe for a moment that Evolutionism falsifies
traditional theism?
Subsequent chapters of Dawkins's book (chapters 5-10) are ancillary
to his polemic against traditional theism, dealing with questions such as:
where does religion come from? Why is it such a powerful force in the
lives of so many? What advantages does it have for us? Do we require
religion in order to "be good?" (No.) Doesn't a religious upbringing con
stitute (or at least promote) child-abuse? (Yes.) According to Dawkins,
religion must be seen as a by-product of something else in the human
make-up, and this is what accounts for its "survival-value." It is similar to
falling in love (which may well be a nice insight). Nonetheless, he regards
it as a "mental virus" (p. 188). Children's minds are especially susceptible
to such "infections," and once the "infection" takes hold, "the child will
grow up and infect the next generation with the same nonsense." Clearly,
there are no lengths to which Dawkins will not go to convince us that
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everything important about our lives can be explained by Darwinism. He
displays a remarkable amount of religious fervor for an atheist. This, of
course, is hardly unusual. (Consider, for example, devotees of Marxism.)
Unfortunately, however, Dawkins's religious zeal is all (mis)directed to
the Church of Natural Selection.

Divine Motivation Theory, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 2004. Pp. xvii + 410. $75 (hardback), $29.99 (paperback).
JOHN LIPPITT, University of Hertfordshire, UK
In this ambitious, wide-ranging book, Linda Zagzebski puts forward 'a
theological virtue ethics in which morality is driven by the attractiveness
of the good,' and central to which is what she labels 'exemplarism' (p. xii).
Through divine motivation theory, Zagzebski aims to challenge (though
not necessarily contradict - see p. 270) divine command theory, with its ten
dency to focus on a conception of morality as law (that is, something that
compels rather than attracts). Zagzebski divides her discussion into three
parts. In part one, she sketches a type of virtue ethics that is 'motivationbased' (p. 1). This part of the theory is intended to be compelling naturalistically; it is not until part two that God becomes central. On this view,
the moral properties of persons, acts and outcomes of acts all derive from
a good motive, whereby what is meant is 'an emotion that initiates and
directs action' (p. 1). Emotions, which for Zagzebski have an important
cognitive dimension, are fundamental to her theory (see chapters 2 to 4).
Indeed, they are the foundation of ethics, as appropriate emotion en
ables us to see the world aright. Her main philosophical inspiration is Ar
istotle, and one of the most interesting aspects of her theory is the empha
sis she puts upon his idea that we learn the good by ostensive definition:
hence exemplarism. Zagzebski proposes that just as Kripke and others
have suggested that natural kind terms such as gold or water should be
defined as whatever is the same kind of thing as that (some 'indexically
identified instance'), so the same method should be followed in ethics. On
this model, the answer to the question 'W hat is a good person?' is always
of the form 'Someone like that.'
In other words, not only is virtue basic, but we learn virtue through di
rect reference to exemplars. Human moral growth and education involves
picking out people who are paradigmatically wise or good, and imitating
them. Just as someone without an education in chemistry can competently
recognise gold when she sees it, so someone unable to give an account of the
nature of practical wisdom can recognise a good, practically wise person
when she sees one. 'We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of iden
tifying the exemplars of goodness' (p. 41). Zagzebski addresses one obvious
objection to this, the issue of variability of exemplars and ethical pluralism,
in part three (chapter 9). Meanwhile part two (chapters 5 to 8) moves from
the naturalistic to 'divine motivation theory' itself. Here, Zagzebski builds
upon the arguments of part one to argue that the true foundation of ethics
is the motives of God, the ultimate exemplar. She offers divine motivation

